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Abstract
Reelection of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister provides a favorable climate for both Donald 
Trump’s first presidential visit to Japan and an improvement of Chinese-Japanese-U.S. 
bilateral relations. In the 22 October 2017 ballot, Abe’s dominant Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito, secured a two-thirds majority in the House 
of Representatives, the lower house of Japan’s bicameral legislature. The coalition already 
holds a supermajority, required for amending the constitution, in the upper house. It 
justified Abe for calling the national elections a year earlier than needed to secure a public 
mandate for addressing the growing North Korean threat and to validate popular support 
for deepening national economic reforms, which have had recent success in boosting 
Japan’s growth rate and the stock market. Still the outcome gave Abe a mandate for his 
policies. However, his stewardship was unclear as several other factors contributed to 
LDP’s overwhelming victory. At the structural level, Japan’s first past the post-electoral 
system tends to amplify electoral wins in comparison to proportional representation 
systems. Abe’s foreign and security policies highly charged with ideological revisionism 
contain the potential to shift Japan onto a new international trajectory in East Asia. Its 
degree of articulation and energy makes for a doctrine capable of displacing the Yoshida 
Doctrine that has been Japan’s dominant grand strategy in the post-war period. Abe will 
remain pragmatic and not challenge the status quo. However, Abe has already begun to 
introduce radical policies that appear to transform national security, US-Japan alliance 
ties and relations with China and East Asia. The Abe Doctrine is dynamic but high risk. 
Abe’s revisionism contains fundamental contradictions that may ultimately limit national 
effectiveness.
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Introduction
In December 2002, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s stunning return to power in a landslide 
election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in a repeat victory in December 
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2014, heralded the resurgence, also for Japan, of a more assertive, high-profile and 
high-risk foreign and security policy. Abe’s status was as an arch revisionist ideologue, 
combined with the track record of his first administration in 2006 to 2007. It indicated 
that he would inevitably harbor intentions to shift Japan towards a more radical external 
agenda characterized by a defense posture less fettered by past anti-militaristic constraints, 
a more fully integrated US–Japan alliance and an emphasis on value-oriented diplomacy 
with East Asian states and beyond. 
It emphasized how Abe’s diplomatic agenda (Abe Gaikō) that has been so distinctive and 
forcefully articulated in the past years might be labeled as a doctrine capable of rivaling, 
and even of displacing the doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that has famously 
determined Japan’s entire post-war international trajectory. In contrast to Abe’s more 
muscular international agenda, the so-called Yoshida Doctrine from Yoshida Rosen, 
forged in the aftermath of the total defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized the 
need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defense posture, 
reliance but not over-dependence on the US–Japan security treaty and the expedient 
rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian neighbors1. 
In mid-March 2013, the ongoing dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku 
Islands in the East China Sea or known in China as the Diaoyu Islands triggered a national 
controversial debate about the trajectory of Japanese politics, and the return to power 
of the old guard; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), further enlivened it. Moreover, as 
LDP’s comeback leader, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is such a self-assertive figure that the 
argument has become inflamed. The Japanese and the international media have already 
concluded the matter, coalescing around the idea that Japan is presently undergoing a 
policy shift to the right. But the truth is not so simple, and this consensus conclusion 
is neither accurate nor useful2. The objective of this paper was to engage and to assess 
the significance of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ for Japan’s international trajectory and whether 
it would lend new dynamism or actually reinforce the dead-end diplomacy of recent 
Japanese administrations.
The impact of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ can best be comprehended through its underpinning 
revisionist ideology. Abe’s ideology derives from a tradition of pre-war colonial and 
wartime attempts to assert for Japan a position as a first-rank nation and leader within 
Asia and a post-war ambition to be regarded as an autonomous state, US equal partner and 
liberal-capitalist power facing down authoritarianism. Abe’s pursuit of this role demands 
the casting off of international and domestic constraints imposed by defeat and the negative 
burden of history. In order to end the post-war regime and return Japan to great power 
status, the Doctrine must overturn taboos on constitutional revision, patriotic education, 
the historical legacies of the ‘comfort women’ or ‘Jugun Ianfu’, the Tokyo Tribunals and 
prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
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The Abe Doctrine: From Post-War Regime to Great Power
The Abe Doctrine has always contained the potential to set Japan on a new international 
trajectory3. Nevertheless, after Abe’s return to the premiership for a second stint, a feat 
for a Japanese politician, previously achieved only by Yoshida in the post-war period, he 
remained keen to stress the continuities with past policies. Japanese government policy-
makers have been at pains to deny that Abe was in any way a dangerous nationalist, and 
to stress that his design was simply to tackle the domestic and international constraints 
that have prevented Japan from overcoming its past torpor in foreign and security policy4. 
This view of Abe as essentially pragmatic and able to rein in his more radical instincts 
has been corroborated by a range of other commentators who predicted that in his second 
premiership he would prioritize the consolidation of his domestic political support, most 
especially because his first administration foundered owing to apparent inattention to the 
basic management of domestic politics, a hyperactive foreign policy and ultimate failure 
to deliver on security promises to the US for the prolongation of the Japan Self-Defense 
Force’s (JSDF) refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of the international 
coalition in Afghanistan5. 
Despite protestations that Abe is essentially pragmatic in outlook, it is clear that his 
worldview has always been underpinned by a strong revisionist ideology now fully surfacing 
as the principal driver of Japan’s foreign and security policies. Abe and his supporters’ 
perspective stands in contrast to the previously dominant paradigm of the Yoshida Doctrine 
which, apart from being broadly conservative in orientation, was largely bereft of ideological 
content and functioned on the basis of expedient adaptation of Japan’s national interests to 
the prevailing status quo in the East Asian regional and US-led international systems. It 
is this strong ideological content and disposition to overturn the status quo which charges 
Abe’s foreign policy with energy and makes it worthy of a true competitor doctrine to that 
of Yoshida.
The Yoshida Doctrine was focused on Japan’s cautious navigation through the post-war 
international system as a defeated and low-profile power. The Abe Doctrine is fixated 
on the recognition of Japan’s position as a first-rank advanced industrial democracy, and 
hence the rightful restoration of its place amongst the great powers, even if this necessitates 
attempts to adjust rather than adapt to the extant international system. Abe’s vision for 
Japan is derived from a tradition of revisionism prevalent amongst much of his Seiwa 
Seisaku Kenkyūkai faction (Fukuda Takeo - Abe Shintarō - Mori Yoshirō faction; currently 
Machimura Nobutaka faction) within the LDP, the ideological and organizational lineage 
which is ultimately traceable back to Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, his grandfather and 
founder of the progenitor faction6. 
Kishi Nobosuke, a former bureaucrat involved in the industrial development of Japanese-
controlled Manchukuo, and later Minister of Munitions during the war and thus involved 
in the Japanese colonial project for the integration of the region under the Greater East 
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Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was originally arrested under the post-war Allied Occupation 
as a ‘Class A’ war crime suspect7. Later, Kishi avoided trial by the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East and was able to reenter politics after the end of the Occupation. He 
found his faction and eventually attained the premiership from 1957 to 1960. Kishi’s faction 
and brand of conservative politics attracted to his banner a number of right-wing nationalist 
and anti-communist politicians.
Kishi strove above all to begin to restore Japan’s national autonomy as a great power and 
portrayed himself as a Cold War warrior in support of the US security strategy in the region 
and globally. He sought autonomy in a fashion– somewhat reminiscent of the Pan-Asianism 
ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was to resuscitate a vision of 
Japan as a leader of a new Asianism or ‘Ajia no Meishu’, and in particular the leader of 
a more integrated Southeast Asia, in order to demonstrate to the US that Japan was not 
an isolated state and was capable of international initiatives and deserved of more equal 
status8. Most notably, Kishi made his first overseas trips as Japan Prime minister to the 
Asian countries and the first by any Japanese prime minister to the region in the post-war 
era, rather than take up the ritual homage like other Japanese premiers to the U.S. Kishi 
engaged in vigorous diplomacy in Southeast Asia; in 1957 he visited Burma, Thailand, 
South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Philippines, and put 
forward a proposal for the creation of a Southeast Asian Development Fund under Japan’s 
direction. Also in the same year, Kishi visited Taiwan as a demonstration of his anti-
communist credentials. He also visited India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand. 
Japan Policy in Asia
Kishi Nobosuke’s other most famous endeavor was the revision of the US and Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960 to strengthen the Cold War bilateral cooperation and most crucially 
to attempt a more equal standing for Japan as a security partner. The Japanese domestic 
political unrest surrounding Kishi’s strong-arm tactics in pushing the revision through the 
National Diet triggered his eventual resignation. 
The Kishi faction was, for much of the remainder of the Cold War period, marginalized 
from power by the LDP’s other more domestically powerful factions: the Kōchikai (Ikeda 
Hayato - Ōhira Masayoshi Miyazawa Kiichi faction-currently Kishida Fumio faction) 
and Heisei Kenkyūkai/Tsushima (Satō Eisaku - Tanaka Kakuei-Takeshita Noboru faction 
currently Nukuga Fukushirō faction). The LDP mainstream helped to fully consolidate the 
so-called 1955 system or ‘Gojūnen Taisei’ of uninterrupted LDP one-party dominance and 
a pragmatic focus largely on domestic economic growth and maintenance of the Yoshida 
Doctrine in line with the foreign policy. 
However, as the LDP mainstream factions’ economic policies and political support faltered 
after the end of the Cold War period with the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble, 
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the anti-mainstream was able to regain power in the guise of Prime Minister Mori’s faction. 
Apart from a brief period the LDP was out of power, displaced by the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) between 2009 and 2012, the Mori faction has proceeded to produce four of the 
five last LDP prime ministers, including the most famously Koizumi Junichiro between 2001 
and 2006 and Abe for his two terms in office. The consequence of the breakdown of Japan’s 
post-war 1955 system, increasing political instability and the return of the descendants of 
the Kishi faction from the right of the political spectrum to capture power was the creation of 
opportunities for Koizumi, but most particularly Shinzo Abe, to implement their long-held 
ideological program for the transformation of the Japanese domestic and foreign policies. 
Koizumi, although an initiator of significant changes in foreign and security policies and 
applauded by many for his willingness to overcome past restraints to enable actions such as 
the dispatch of the Japan Special Defense Force to support US-led coalitions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, was arguably less ideologically oriented and more opportunistic in foreign policy, 
seeking to use these issues to build international legitimacy to effect his true ideological 
agenda of neoliberal reform for the Japanese economy and political system. In contrast, Abe 
is arguably less ideological in economic policy, only experimenting with ‘Abenomics’ as 
an opportunity to create the second time round the domestic political support necessary to 
provide a free hand to pursue his true ideological agenda in foreign policy9.
 
Since 2012, Abe’s ideological stance and objectives in many ways echo those of his 
grandfather in seeking recognition of Japan’s standing amongst the first rank, or ‘Tier One’, 
of capitalist powers, recovery of its autonomy as an international player, recognition as a 
crucial US partner and leader in Asian countries, and confrontation of hostile authoritarian 
regimes in the contemporary period in the guise of China and North Korea10. 
Shinzo Abe argues that this project for the restoration of Japan as a great power can be 
achieved only by overturning the constraints of the past imposed on Japanese freedom of 
international action. Abe and the Japan Revisionists posit that defeat in the Pacific War, 
the meting out of the victor’s justice of the Tokyo tribunals and the conviction of ‘Class 
A’ war criminals without alleged precedent in International Law, the unwarranted singling 
out of Japan as an aggressor in East Asia compared to other imperial great powers, and 
the externally imposed reforms for the demilitarization of the Japanese Occupation (1939-
1945) have created a burden of history that has robbed Japan of its true national identity 
and vitality. 
Hence, for Shinzo Abe and his supporters it is only by unburdening itself from this so-
called masochistic or ‘Jigyaku-Teki’ history and by escaping from the post-war or ‘Sengo 
Dakkyaku’ regime can be viewed essentially as a regime of defeat that Japan can start 
to rehabilitate its national strength and autonomy11. Abe has talked of Japan restoring its 
sense of national patriotism, along with a new stress upon the promotion of the values of 
democracy, liberal market economy and the rule of law. It is all values drawn in implicit yet 
deliberate contradistinction to the authoritarianism of China and North Korea12. 
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Shinzo Abe, who returned to power in late 2012 following the Liberal Democratic Party’s 
landslide victory in the Diet’s lower-house elections, has pushed aggressively to realize 
his ambitious agenda. Within a year of being elected, Abe instituted sweeping reforms 
to the national security apparatus. In December 2013, Japan announced the formation of 
a National Security Council (NSC) modeled after that of the United States. The council 
streamlines the Prime Minister’s decision-making process while breaking down the various 
bureaucratic barriers that have impeded effective crisis management. Tokyo also enacted 
a controversial state-secrets law that tightened the government’s control of sensitive and 
classified information, enabling the NSC to centralize the handling of intelligence.
The ASEAN Summit in Manila, Philippines, on 14 November 2017 resulted in 4 (four) 
commitments made by ASEAN leaders and its counterpart on the South China Sea dispute, 
terrorism, humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar, and the Korean Peninsula 
Crisis13.  
Thus, if Abe was expected to take any radical action in international policy, the general 
consensus was that it would wait until securing a working majority in the Upper House 
elections in July 2013 to match the straight majority secured by the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) in the Lower House in the December 2012 elections14. At the tactical level, Abe 
skillfully exploited the recent resurgence in his popularity and the division among the LDP’s 
opponents. The main opposition Democratic Party, disintegrated into rival conservative and 
leftist wings; neither did well on 22 October 2017.
Moreover, even then the presumption was that Abe would be wary of pushing his strongest 
revisionist agenda for fear of disaffecting the LDP’s dovish New Komeito coalition 
partner, of worsening the already fraught relations with China and South Korea and even 
of alienating a US not keen to see Japan unsettling the strategic landscape as it was in the 
midst of a ‘rebalance’ towards the East Asia region. Japan’s major focus under Abe was 
instead thought to be domestic economic recovery, and if there was to be any radicalism 
and international risks posed, these were to be in the form of his eponymous policy of 
‘Abenomics’ and its associated 3 (three) arrows of massive quantitative easing, fiscal 
stimulus and economic restructuring. These predictions surrounding Abe’s agenda were 
largely borne out for the first six months of his administration. Despite Abe’s stated intent at 
the start of his administration to review the Japanese government’s statement on the ‘comfort 
women’ (Jugun Ianfu) issue which was an ambition held over from his first premiership that 
his government subsequently backed away in early 2014, conscious of the negative reaction 
domestically and internationally. 
Moreover, even though Abe’s Cabinet was replete with noted right-wing conservatives, 
three of whom had visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 2013 to 
commemorate the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, the prime minister 
himself stayed away. Instead, he seemed content to stress his revisionist credentials with 
photo opportunities sitting in a Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) main battle tank and 
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Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) trainer jet15. Furthermore, even though Abe maintained a 
tough stance towards China in the ongoing tensions in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu territorial dispute and issues of maritime security, he began to initiate vigorous 
diplomacy with the US and other East Asian states to project Japan’s international presence 
in contradistinction to China. His administration did not pursue the hard-line security options 
intimated in the LDP’s election manifesto. Abe himself repeatedly called for dialogues with 
China and stressed Japan’s attachment to a form of revamped ‘proactive contribution to 
peace’ (Sekkyoku-Teki Heiwashugi).
Abe’s apparent restrained statesmanship won plaudits domestically and internationally: 
efforts to revitalize the Japanese economy earned him the depiction of a Superman-like 
figure on the cover of The Economist in May 201316. Abenomics garnered praise at the 
Group of Eight (G8) summit in the UK in June. It appeared overall that Abe’s slogan ‘Japan 
is back’ was highly credible17. However, from autumn 2013 onwards, the full guise of Abe’s 
revisionist agenda, and thus the propensity for setting Japan on a new radical trajectory in 
foreign and security policy, has become readily apparent. 
Abe’s initiation of new developments in Japan’s defense doctrines and capabilities and the 
US–Japan relations provided the first signs of a revisionist agenda coalescing in line with 
the expectations of many commentators18. Nevertheless, Abe’s decision to pay an official 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 26 December 2013, exactly within one year of his assuming 
office, indicated not only that his revisionism was gathering momentum but also that there 
were now diminishing constraints on the full extent of the prime minister’s ambitions. The 
visit surprised and drew sharp criticism from policy-makers and the public not only in 
China and South Korea but also in the US, and even the wider international community, 
as a highly provocative move with potentially deep ramifications for Japan’s international 
reputation and regional stability.
Now that Abe’s ‘true colors’ (Abe-iro) and revisionist agenda are finally revealed, and 
he appears secure in power until possibly 2018, questions have begun to fly about the 
significance of Japanese foreign and security policies. Japanese government policy-makers 
have remained engaged in increasingly problematic attempts to deny Abe’s nationalist or 
even militarist bent and to stress continuities with past policies, whilst at the same time 
arguing that the prime minister’s challenging of taboos is essential for Japan to overcome its 
malaise in responding to external pressures from China and North Korea and expectations 
from the US and the international community for a wider commitment to global security. 
Meanwhile, those critical of Abe have ramped up their arguments that he is intent on an 
irresponsible campaign of overturning post-war constraints on Japanese military power that 
will only worsen security relations with China and alienate South Korea and other East 
Asian partners. The objective of this paper was to engage and assess the significance of the 
‘Abe Doctrine’ for Japan’s international trajectory and whether it will lend new dynamism 
or actually reinforce the dead-end diplomacy of recent Japanese administrations. The paper 
undertook this task by analyzing in depth the ideological foundations and policy objectives 
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of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ and how it plays out across three pivotal dimensions, or another three 
policy arrows, of Japan’s foreign and security policy: Japanese defense capabilities; the 
evolution of the US–Japan alliance; and relations with China, South Korea, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other key states in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moreover, in appraising the impact of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ across these three dimensions, the 
writer argues that whilst neither apologist or critical views of Abe as a figure of post-war 
continuity nor a rewind to a pre-war ultranationalist past are entirely accurate, there can 
be no doubt that his administration is fundamentally revisionist and nationalist in outlook 
and is thus set upon, and in fact is already shifting Japan towards a radical trajectory. This 
can be seen in the rapid-fire changes to security policy in the form of the new National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Security Council (NSC), State Secrecy Law, 
Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers and most significantly breach of the ban 
on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. 
In US–Japan relations, Abe has moved ahead with the first revision of the Defense Guidelines 
since 1997 with the aim of enabling Japan to support the US in not just the East Asia 
region but also in global contingencies; the plans for the massive relocation of US Marine 
Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa; and Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). They are all designed to boost the US Rebalance to the region. In East 
Asia, Abe’s diplomacy has looked into buildings a coalition of like-minded states to assist 
in the quiet encirclement of China. In turn, this paper argued that even though the rise of the 
‘Abe Doctrine’ is undoubtedly generating a more proactive Japanese foreign policy and has 
achieved some quick wins in raising international profile and influence. Over the medium- 
to long-term, the policy is strategically short-sighted, hard to sustain and ultimately counter-
productive to Japan’s national interests. Hence, this paper tended towards a verdict more 
in line with the critiques of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ that view it as steering Japan towards a new 
dead end in foreign and security policies, a dead end largely of Japan’s own making which 
will result not only in an eventual lack of international momentum but also, along the way, 
serious long-term collateral damage to regional relations. It moves towards emphasizing the 
rise and then probable failure of the ‘Abe Doctrine’. The signs are already apparent that the 
Abe administration is beginning to struggle in the substantive implementation of domestic 
and foreign policies that can be understood as largely inevitable because of a series of 
internal and hence inescapable contradictions.
These relate, perhaps ironically, to a doctrine that might pride itself on a clearly articulated 
ideology and strategy, and to ideological tenets that are fundamentally incompatible with 
the mechanisms and objectives that it seeks to utilize and achieve.
The eventual conclusion is that the ‘Abe Doctrine’ is likely to riven with its own contradictions 
that rather than producing a new and clear strategic paradigm for Japan, or reverting back to 
the previous traditions of the Yoshida Doctrine, it reinforces an increasingly prominent and 
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long-term trend in Japanese foreign policy characterized at various turns by unpredictability, 
obduracy and antagonism towards regional neighbors and even the US, or what might be 
termed as a new ‘Resentful Realism’.
Conclusion
As the first non-Western country to modernize its society, government, and economy, Japan 
has been one of the most powerful Asian states since the late nineteenth century up to the 
present time. Despite over two decades of economic stagnation, it remains highly developed, 
and its economy is slowly adjusting to a postindustrial era. The Shinzo Abe government is 
competent and organizationally complex, while elites in both the public and private sectors 
are highly educated and capable. Japan’s natural resources are limited, but its other national 
resources are well-developed. 
Indeed, though hampered by groupthink and risk aversion, Japan’s political, corporate, and 
intellectual leaders achieve high levels of national performance, despite ongoing internal 
rivalry, group interests and the lack of individual leadership. These strengths translate into 
military capabilities that are unmatched by most states in the Asia-Pacific region. However, 
Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on overseas military operations and an unwillingness to 
build a military force commensurate with its economic size have resulted in a smaller and 
less operationally experienced military than would otherwise be expected.
Japan’s greatest need is to embrace radical structural reform in its economy, thereby 
revitalizing innovation and competitiveness and sparking sustainable postindustrial growth.
Therefore, Japan should embrace Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plans for a more regionally 
and internationally engaged foreign policy integrated with other Asian leaders’ political 
economy interests that offer unstinting liberal support for an open, pursuing rules-based 
order in Asia-Pacific. 
Japan must expand and modernize its military, even beyond Abe’s current plans, and free 
itself from domestic restraints that prevent it from playing a central role with liberal allies 
in maintaining regional stability.
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